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This paper studies how a high overtime wage rate and a low labor
stock may be used as commitment devices by price-setting ﬁrms. We
show that high overtime pay premiums may both decrease and increase
equilibrium employment. If an employment-oriented union or the ﬁrm
itself sets the overtime wage, then the overtime wage premium will be
high enough to ensure that no overtime is used in equilibrium. If the
overtime wage is set by a suﬃciently wage-oriented union, however,
overtime will be used in equilibrium, and employment is substantially
lower. Thus the authorities may be able to increase employment if
it can make a union act in a less wage-oriented manner. We show
that this can be done by setting a minimum overtime pay premium.
Minimum wage regulation could have the opposite eﬀect.
Keywords: Overtime, Bertrand competition, unionization, regula-
tion.
JEL classiﬁcation: J21, J51, J88, L13.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of unionization, minimum wages and regulated
overtime pay premiums on labor market outcomes under price competition
in the output market. We ﬁnd that both a high overtime wage and a low
∗I would like to thank Kjell Erik Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume and Steinar Vagstad
for valuable suggestions and advice.
†Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Fosswinckelsgate 6, 5007 Bergen,
Norway. E-mail: frode.meland@econ.uib.no.
1production capacity may be used by price setting ﬁr m sa sac o m m i t m e n t
device to reduce competition. The ﬁr m st h e m s e l v e sw o u l dp r e f e rah i g h
overtime wage - which eﬀectively commits the ﬁrm not to use any overtime.
An employment-oriented union would also want to induce the ﬁrm to choose
this strategy. A wage-oriented union, however, could prefer a situation where
the ﬁrm utilizes full overtime in equilibrium, thereby using the constrained
production capacity to push up prices. We show that minimum wage legisla-
tion may induce unions to act in a more wage-oriented manner, which could
in some cases have detrimental eﬀects on employment. A regulated overtime
pay premium, however, would pull in the opposite direction, as it induces
unions to behave similarly to a more employment-oriented union. A cap on
overtime hours is shown to increase labor demand only if wages are set by a
wage-oriented union.
In many countries and industries there are restrictions on the regular
wages and the overtime pay that can be accepted. These kinds of restric-
tions often take the form of minimum wages and regulated overtime pay
premiums.1 In the U.S. for instance, The Fair Standards Act of 1938 intro-
duced a minimum wage, and set the overtime wage to at least 150% of the
normal (base) wage. However, institutions other than the authorities may
also want such regulations. A likely candidate is labor unions. However,
with imperfect competition in the output market and ﬁrms competing in
prices, the ﬁrms themselves may also want high overtime wage premiums, as
t h i sc o u l di ne ﬀect serve as a commitment to less ﬁerce competition. In a
Bertrand set-up, such a commitment could lead to a favorable response by
the competitors.2 We show that this may reduce the authorities’ incentives
to provide legislation aﬀecting overtime pay premiums in the non-unionized
case, but may make the same kind of legislation even more important in the
unionized case.
The eﬀects of overtime pay premiums on labor market outcomes are theo-
retically indeterminate. A higher premium may make ﬁr m sh i r em o r el a bo rt o
avoid overtime pay, thus increasing employment.3 However this substitution
eﬀect is countered by at least two other eﬀects: First there is an ‘income’- or
scale-eﬀect: Higher overtime pay premiums will raise the (marginal) costs of
ﬁrms utilizing overtime, and thus employment may go down.4 Also, there is
a capital substitution eﬀe c t ,a st h eo v e r t i m ep r e m i u mm a ya l t e rt h er e l a t i v e
1For a survey on the eﬀects of minimum wages, see for instance Brown et al (1982).
2Throughout this paper, we assume that prices set by the ﬁrms are strategic comple-
ments, ensuring that this eﬀect prevails.
3The earliest papers focusing on this eﬀect are Rosen (1968) and Ehrenberg (1970,
1971). They assume that the base wage stays unaﬀected by a higher overtime pay premium.
4See Nussbaum and Wise (1977).
2costs of capital to labor. Thus the net eﬀect of overtime premiums is highly
uncertain, and dependent on the speciﬁcs of the markets studied.5
Lewis (1969) argues that, despite the above indeterminacies, overtime
pay premiums may have no eﬀect on economic behavior: Put simply, he
argues that an employee who works overtime does not care what the base
and overtime wages are per se; what is important is the total wage income.
T h u st h ee m p l o y e em a yb ew i l l i n gt ow o r kj u s ta sm u c ha sb e f o r ew i t hal o w e r
base wage and a higher overtime pay premium. Following this argument, an
increased overtime wage may have no real eﬀects, except in the case where
t h eb a s ew a g ei sr e s t r i c t e db yam i n i m u mw a g e . T h i sk i n do fm o d e li s
characterized by Trejo (1991) as a ‘ﬁxed job’ model as it involves the same
total work hours at the same total wage. The important aspect of the model
is that it incorporates the base wage being aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
overtime pay premium. In this paper we also study such a possibility, but
through wage setting by unions. Our model thus endogenizes wage decisions
while at the same time incorporating both the substitution eﬀect and scale
eﬀect. However, we disregard capital substitution.
The ‘ﬁxed job’ model suggests that overtime may be used independently
of the overtime pay legislation as long as the minimum wage does not bind.
Accordingly, these models cannot explain the fact that the distribution of
hours of work across employees shows a spike at the number of hours corre-
sponding to the normal working day (see Trejo (1991)). The present model
oﬀe r sa ne x p l a n a t i o nf o rs u c has p i k ee v e nw h e nt h eb a s ew a g ei se n d o g e -
nized. Also, Trejo (1991) suggests that the scale eﬀect may reduce the role
of regulation as a job creation device. In our model, however, we show that
regulating overtime pay premiums may have a dramatic (positive) eﬀect on
employment in cases where unions are wage-oriented.
Our model is one of imperfect competition. Overtime pay premiums un-
der imperfect competition have also been studied in an interesting paper by
King (1997). His set-up is, however, somewhat diﬀerent from ours: First,
where we use price competition in diﬀerentiated products, King adopts the
Cournot, homogenous product set-up. Second, we endogenize the employ-
ment decision (right to manage) whereas King assumes the labor stock to
be exogenously determined. For there to be any real focus on overtime, the
regular labor stock has to be somehow set in advance. Endogenizing the
5While empirical evidence suggests that overtime premiums increase the ratio of em-
ployment to hours per worker (for a recent study from California, see Hamermesh and
Trejo (2000)), this does not imply that employment necessarily increases. Bauer and
Zimmermann (1999) provide evidence from Germany suggesting that employment might
instead fall.
3employment decision thus enriches the set-up.6
King ﬁnds that an overtime pay penalty, initiated either by the authorities
or by industry wide unions, may increase ﬁrm proﬁts. This is due to the fact
that such a move could increase marginal costs (decreasing industry output)
without increasing average costs to a large degree.7 This result is also found
in the present paper. However, if the ﬁr m sw e r ea b l et oc h o o s ee m p l o y m e n t
in King’s set-up, the underlying speciﬁcs of the Cournot competition could
typically eradicate the positive proﬁte ﬀect of a high overtime pay penalty:
If a ﬁrm increases its labor stock (enough to be able to produce without
utilizing overtime) in a situation where the competitors use overtime, the
ﬁrm obtains a cost advantage relative to the other ﬁrms. This leads to a
strategic reduction in the output of the competitors. Thus, with endogenous
employment decisions and Cournot competition, the positive proﬁte ﬀect of
a high overtime wage premium could be reversed. In our model we assume
price competition. In this case an increase in the overtime pay premium may
indeed increase the proﬁts of ﬁrms even when they can set the labor stock
prior to competition. With price competition, there is a positive strategic
eﬀect from incurring higher marginal costs, and thus the ﬁrms may even
choose a high overtime wage themselves.
In our Bertrand set-up, ﬁrms could obtain a strategic advantage by either
facing a high overtime wage or choosing a low labor stock. High overtime
wages could credibly commit ﬁr m sn o tt ou s eo v e r t i m e ,w h i l eal o we m p l o y -
ment level eﬀectively restricts output through the limited amount of overtime
that may be utilized.8 Say that a single worker can produce one unit during
regular hours and another additional unit if working full overtime. Then,
with n workers, a ﬁrm would have a capacity limit of 2n units. However,
given a very high overtime wage, the eﬀective capacity constraint of the ﬁrm
is the normal production capacity, n. In our model we endogenize the em-
ployment demand decision, and study under what circumstances the ﬁrm
prefers to commit to non-aggressive pricing by restricting the normal or the
full production capacity. The relative proﬁtability of these two options will,
of course, depend upon the level of the overtime pay premium. This has
important eﬀects on union wage setting, and we show that a slightly more
6Also, we assume that regular wage costs are in eﬀect sunk at the time of price com-
petition. This is not unreasonable given the fact that the labor stock is set in advance.
Thus ﬁrms eﬀectively compete under zero marginal labor costs up to the point where every
worker is producing all they can during regular hours.
7Of course, this would only be valid if the employment of every ﬁrm is suﬃciently large,
so that the increase in marginal costs has a small eﬀect on average costs.
8In reference to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), these two strategies would both be char-
acterized as ‘puppy-dog ploys’.
4wage-oriented union may choose a strategy involving dramatically lower em-
ployment than a less wage-oriented union.9 T h i sc o u l dl e a dt oo v e r t i m ep a y
premium legislation having a large impact on unemployment.
The next section describes the model, section 3 discusses price setting be-
havior, and labor demand is addressed in section 4. Section 5 discusses wage
setting; both if the ﬁrm is allowed to set the overtime premium and if wages
are set by unions. In section 6 we discuss what happens if the authorities
set a minimum wage, an overtime pay premium or a cap on overtime hours.
Section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We model a diﬀerentiated product oligopoly, focusing on a single ﬁrm (ﬁrm 1)
facing competitors producing an imperfectly substitutable good. The timing
of the model is as follows: First, wages are decided. We discuss what happens
both if ﬁrm 1 has the power to decide overtime pay premiums, and if a union
sets wages. Following wage setting, the ﬁrm unilaterally sets the employment
level, before ﬁnally choosing the product price, competing in the output
market. This set-up then follows the right-to-manage literature both by
allowing the ﬁrm to unilaterally decide employment, and by assuming wage
setting to be a more long-term commitment than employment decisions. As
already explained, there has to be some ﬁxed number of workers at stage 3
when prices are set in order to make overtime an option. If not, the ﬁrm has
no credible commitment, and could simply hire as many workers as is needed
without using overtime.10
We assume that the inverse demand functions for the two diﬀerentiated
products are given by:11
p =1− x − by (1)
q =1− y − bx (2)
9Trejo (1993) shows that U.S. data supports a notion that unionization will in and by
itself lead to overtime premiums, reducing the overtime hours used and possibly expanding
employment.
10In our simple one-shot set-up, a union would have an incentive to push up wages (if
possible) after the labor stock is set. In a repeated game, however, the union may refrain
from opportunistic behavior of this sort, and we therefore assume that wages are in fact
ﬁxed when the labor stock and prices are set.
11These kind of demand functions can be obtained from a representative consumer
maximizing a quadratic utility function.
5b is the diﬀerentiation parameter, 0 <b<1. x is the production by ﬁrm
1, p being the corresponding price. y and q are the total production level
and (the uniform) price of the competing ﬁrms. Solving for quantities yields:
x(p,q)=
1 − b − p + bq
1 − b2 (3)
y(p,q)=
1 − b − q + bp
1 − b2 (4)
We assume that labor is the only factor of production in ﬁrm 1, and that
a single worker will produce one unit of output during regular hours.12 In
addition, by using overtime, the worker can produce at most γ more units.
Total possible sales from ﬁrm 1 are thus n(1 + γ). The worker receives a
compensation w1 for the regular hours and w2 for any additional hours. For
simplicity we assume w2 >w 1.13 However, having set the total number of
workers, n, the ﬁxed wage cost w1n is also determined, and production up
to the level n involves a perceived zero marginal cost (at the price-setting
stage). Overtime can be used in varying amounts, though, and production
levels between n and n(1 + γ) involve a marginal production cost of w2.
With the current set-up, ﬁrm 1 has eﬀectively two instruments through
w h i c hi tc a np u s hu pp r i c e s . Ah i g ho v e r t i m ew a g ec o m m i t st h eﬁrm to a
high marginal cost (and thus a high price) if it is to produce using overtime.
However, the ﬁrm may also use the capacity of its plant(s) to credibly commit
to non-aggressive pricing.
We solve by backwards induction. Given wages and employment, prices
are determined last.
3 Price setting
When setting prices, ﬁrm 1 (the ﬁrm, henceforth) is assumed to choose the





px(p,q) − w1ni f x (p,q) <n
(p − w1)n +[ p − w2][x(p,q) − n] if n ≤ x(p,q) ≤ n(1 + γ)
(p − w1)n +( p − w2)nγ if n(1 + γ) <x (p,q)
(5)
12Thus we abstract from the before-mentioned capital substitution eﬀect.
13This type of restriction is found in most kinds of overtime pay regulations. However,
in the present Bertrand set-up, ﬁrms and unions could all want a high overtime wage.
Nonetheless, to avoid lengthy discussions of less interesting cases, we restrict attention to
situations where it is assumed that the overtime wage exceeds the regular wage.
14Note that the regular wage costs are ﬁxed at this stage since the labor stock has
already been determined.
6T h i sg i v e su sd i ﬀerent best reply functions for the diﬀerent regimes as
expressed in (5). Noting that x(p,q) <n⇔ [1−b][1−n(1+b)]+bq < p and
n(1 + γ) <x (p,q) ⇔ p<[1 − b][1 − n(1 + γ)(1 + b)] + bq, it is easily shown
that the following picture describes the situation:
The ﬁgure shows three diﬀerent points, A, B and C, constraining the
diﬀerent possible equilibria. For q>q C, where
qC =
w2 − 1+2 n(1 − b2)(1 + γ)+b
b
, (6)
the best reply to a price q, is to choose the highest possible price that enables
the ﬁrm to sell everything it produces when utilizing full overtime. In this
case, p =[ 1− b][1 − n(1 + γ)(1 + b)] + bq.
For q ∈ (qB,q C], where
qB =
w2 − 1+2 n(1 − b2)+b
b
, (7)
it turns out to be optimal for the ﬁr mo n l yt ou s ep a r to v e r t i m e .T h eb e s t
reply to a price q by the competitor is p = 1
2(w2+1−b+bq). In this segment,
the price of the competing good is not high enough to warrant setting a price
that leads to full overtime production. Neither does the ﬁrm want to set a
price that makes it produce without using overtime.
For q ∈ (qA,q B], where
qA =
−1+2 n(1 − b2)+b
b
, (8)
7it is optimal to price according to normal capacity. That is to set a price
just high enough to avoid any use of overtime, which implies choosing p =
[1 − b][1 − n(1 + b)] + bq.
For q ≤ qA, the best reply involves a price which induces a level of sales
below the normal production capacity n (even though workers eﬀectively
produce at zero marginal cost). Formally, the best reply function in this
segment is given by p = 1
2(1 − b + bq).






2(1 − b + bq) if q < qA
[1 − b][1 − n(1 + b)] + bq if qA ≤ q<q B
1
2(w2 +1− b + bq) if qB ≤ q<q C
[1 − b][1 − n(1 + γ)(1 + b)] + bq if q ≥ qC
(9)
To obtain a situation where committing to non-aggressive pricing yields
a positive strategic feedback, we need to specify a market structure where
the competitors respond to a higher p by increasing q. To obtain closed form
solutions and to make the analysis as tractable as possible, we specify the




(1 − b + bp) (10)
This would be the optimum price set by a single price setting ﬁrm pro-
ducing under a non-binding capacity constraint and zero marginal costs.
However, it should rather be thought of as a simple way to quantify that
committing to a high price can induce a positive strategic response in the
market.
The Nash-Bertrand equilibrium is then given by:
p,q =

   
   
1−b
2−b, 1−b








4−b2 if nC ≤ n<n B
(1 − b)
2+b−2n(1+γ)(b+1)
2−b2 ,(1 − b2)
1−bn(1+γ)





(1 + b)(2− b)
(12)
nB =
(b +2 )( 1− b) − (2 − b2)w2
(1 − b2)(4− b2)
(13)
nC =
(b +2 )( 1− b) − (2 − b2)w2
(1 − b2)(4− b2)(1+γ)
(14)
8For later reference, the following ﬁgure illustrates an equilibrium corre-
sponding to the second regime in (11). Here, overtime is not used in equi-
librium. However, the prices are pushed up relative to the situation where
the ﬁrm has excess capacity: Since it cannot produce more without incurring
high marginal costs (w2), the ﬁrm has committed to non-aggressive pricing,
yielding a positive strategic feedback.
4E m p l o y m e n t
We use backwards induction, and assume that the ﬁrm can estimate the
equilibrium prices in the price setting game, choosing employment based on




      
      
1−b
(1+b)(2−b)2 − w1ni f n ≥ nA
n[
(1−b)(2+b)−2n(1−b2)









if nC ≤ n<n B
(1−b)(2+b)−2n(1+γ)(1−b2)
2−b2 n(1 + γ) − (w1 + w2γ)ni f n < n C
(15)
In the ﬁr s tc a s ew ea r ei nas i t u a t i o nw h e r et h et w ob e s tr e p l yf u n c t i o n s
cross to the left of A (ﬁgure 1). The ﬁrm is then utilizing only parts of
the regular work force. A lower labor stock does not increase prices, but it
does decrease labor costs (some workers are presently idle). And contrary
to what is the case in the pricing game, the ﬁrm now takes this cost into
9consideration. Thus the lowest possible level of n that ensures the desired
production is the optimum. That is, n = nA.
However, the ﬁrm can possibly do even better. By further decreasing the
employment level, it can push prices up. As long as w2 > 0 (w2 >w 1 is
not necessary for this result), the ﬁrm can credibly commit to non-aggressive
pricing, at least if the number of workers is suﬃciently large. Restricting
the work force beyond the point A reduces equilibrium sales, but pushes





(1 − b)(2 + b) − w1(2 − b2)
1 − b2 (16)
for the second case (ﬁgure 2).15 However, for this employment level to be a
valid representation of the optimum, it has to satisfy nB ≤ n1 <n A, or
w1 ≤
−b2 (b +2 )( 1− b)+4 w2(2 − b2)





2 1 − b
(2 − b)(2− b2)
(18)
The second inequality always holds. This means that the ﬁrm will never
choose an employment level corresponding to nA, as a further reduction in the
labor stock induces a relatively high increase in equilibrium prices compared
to the reduction in equilibrium sales.
For w1 ≤ w∗
1, a candidate for an optimum is thus given by n1. However,
for w1 >w ∗
1, the overtime wage is not suﬃciently high to make the above
optimum level of employment a credible restriction not to use overtime, and
thus n is restricted to the point B. That is:
n2 ,
(1 − b)(2 + b) − w2(2 − b2)
(1 − b2)(4− b2)
(19)
Either way, we have shown the following:
Remark 1 Using the commitment provided by the overtime wage is always
more proﬁtable than not doing so. In addition, any non-zero overtime wage
will provide some degree of commitment when the labor stock is already set,
as it raises marginal costs above zero.
15It is worth noting that if this is to be positive, we need w1 < 2−b−b2
2−b2 . This means that
as products become perfect substitutes (b =1 ) ,w a g e sh a v et od r o pt oz e r ot om a k ei t
proﬁtable to produce at all.
10This result does not depend critically upon the linear demand system
that we use in the formal analysis: Restricting production by increasing
prices always involves a positive pricing response from the competitors when
prices are strategic complements. As long as the slope of the reaction function
between qA and qB (ﬁgure 1) is larger than for q<q A, there is an additional
incentive to decrease the labor stock in order to induce an even higher increase
in the competitors’ price. This would hold in every situation where the
reaction function has an upward kink, which clearly does not apply only to
linear demand systems.
In the third regime, the eﬀects on proﬁts from an increase in the employ-
ment level turns out to be particularly simple:
d
dn
Π = w2 − w1 > 0 (20)
Thus in this case the highest possible labor stock, n, would be the equilib-
rium. This again gives us n2 as the candidate for an optimum. The intuition
behind this result is as follows: When the ﬁrm utilizes overtime only in part,
an increase in the labor stock has one eﬀect; the ﬁrm is able to substitute
overtime with regular working hours. This is a direct cost advantage. There
is no pricing response, as this substitution of costs alters only the average
costs, not the marginal costs (still w2). Thus the ﬁrm would like to increase
the labor stock to the point where no overtime is used (but the marginal cost
of producing more is still w2).
Producing while utilizing overtime (i.e. choosing a low employment level)
may nonetheless be a good idea, but only if the ﬁrm is able to push up prices
beyond point C (ﬁgure 1). In this situation average costs are relatively high.
However, since the ﬁrm is not able to produce more than its full capacity,
it credibly commits to choose a high price, inducing a favorable response by
the competitors. Formally, the internal optimum in this case is given by:
n3 ,
(b +2 )( 1− b)(1+γ) − (2 − b2)(w1 + w2γ)
4(1+γ)
2 (1 − b2)
(21)
Now, if this employment level corresponds to a point to the left of point
C in ﬁgure 1, we know that the labor stock associated with point C yields
higher proﬁts. In addition, n2 is then better than n3. Thus a necessary (but
not suﬃcient) restriction for the above employment level to be a maximum
is that the resulting pricing game equilibrium lies to the right of point C :
(b +2 )( 1− b)(1+γ) − (2 − b2)(w1 + w2γ)
4(1+γ)
2 (1 − b2)
(22)
≤
(b +2 )( 1− b) − w2(2 − b2)
(1 − b2)(4− b2)(1+γ)
⇔ (23)
11w1 ≥
(2 − b2)(4 + γb2)w2 − b2 (b +2 )( 1− b)(1+γ)




This discussion is summarized in the below Proposition:
Proposition 2 It is never beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm to choose the labor stock
in such a way that only parts of it is utilized for production, even when
using overtime. The ﬁrm will always restrict employment such that either the
overtime pay or the capacity of the plant (full overtime production) induces
a positive pricing response by the competing ﬁrm(s).
The intuition behind this result for the case of overtime follows the same
lines as for Remark 1: The best reply function again has an upward kink at
point C, and therefore restrictinge m p l o y m e n tm o r ei sb e n e ﬁcial. Again, the
result does not depend critically upon linear demand.





n1 if w1 ≤ w∗
1
n2 if w1 >w ∗
1
n3 if w1 ≥ w∗∗
1
(25)
If we compare the proﬁts from n3 and n2,w ec a nﬁnd a switch-oﬀ point
where n3 is the better option. Following the above discussion, this would
imply that w1 is strictly greater than w∗∗
1 . However, we cannot be sure that
this is the relevant switch-oﬀ point for the ﬁrm as n1 may still dominate n3.




1. This is proven in Appendix A. Thus, having determined this, we












1 >w 1 >w ∗
1
(2+b)(1−b)(1+γ)−(2−b2)(w1+w2γ)




1 is given in Appendix A.
To recapitulate the intuition behind the above equilibrium, it is important
to note that the ﬁrm faces two possibilities when it comes to inducing higher
prices:
1. Choose employment high enough so that the pricing game equilibrium
involves no use of overtime, but low enough to induce a positive pricing
response (producing at normal capacity n). This is the case if the ﬁrm
chooses either n1 or n2.
122. Choose an even lower employment level, leaving production at the full
capacity level, and proﬁting from using the capacity constraint to in-
crease equilibrium prices.
As is easily shown from the expressions of n1,n 2 and n3, a higher overtime
wage will never lead to higher employment within any of the three regimes
( d
dw2ni ≤ 0, ∀i). We can however not conclude from this that an increase in
t h eo v e r t i m ew a g ew i l lr e d u c ee m p l o y m e n t .I ti sf a i r l ye a s yt os h o wt h a tb o t h
d
dw2w∗
1 > 0 and d
dw2w∗∗∗
1 > 0. This means that as w2 increases, n1 becomes
a more likely optimum (the interval where n1 is optimal increases) and n3
becomes a less likely optimum. Since n3 is the option related to the lowest
employment and n1 is similarly involves higher employment than either n2
or n3, we have proven the following:
Proposition 3 An increase in the overtime wage might increase equilibrium
employment.
Again, this will be valid for a wider range of demand systems than the
family of linear demand systems analyzed in this paper: Suppose that the
overtime pay premium is inﬁnite (w2 →∞ ). Then overtime will never be
used, and the employment level n eﬀectively becomes the maximum produc-
tion level. The ﬁrm can thus restrict n in order to push prices up. Assume
that the optimum employment level in this situation is nH. On the other
hand, for very low w2, t h eo v e r t i m ew a g ed o e sn o tc o n s t i t u t eac r e d i b l e
output restricting device. In this case, the ﬁr mw o u l dh a v et or e s t r i c tf u l l
overtime production, n(1+γ), to increase prices. Assume that the optimum
employment level is nL in this case. Now suppose that the ﬁrm aims at pro-
ducing t h es a m ea m o u n tin both cases.16 Then nH = nL(1 + γ) implying
nH >n L. For a level of the overtime wage somewhere between the two ex-
tremes discussed above, the ﬁrm will be indiﬀerent between the two options.
Thus an increase in the overtime wage may lead to a shift in strategies from
overtime production to regular production, increasing employment.
In such situations, strict labor regulation, or even unionization, may be
favorable to employment. We discuss this in the next sections.
16The pricing responses from committing to a lower production through a high overtime
wage combined with low n, or only through low full-production capacity, n(1+γ), are the
same. Thus there is no reason for the ﬁrm, on the grounds of pushing up prices, to
choose nH <n L(1+γ). This could apply equally to other demand systems. Furthermore,
production using overtime would imply higher costs (marginal as well as average), which
r a t h e rw o u l dl e a dt onH >n L(1 + γ) than the other way around. Consequently, these
kind of considerations can only strengthen our conclusions.
135W a g e s e t t i n g
In this section, we discuss diﬀerent wage setting procedures. In order to form
a benchmark case, we start out investigating what the ﬁrm itself would do
if it could set the overtime wage. We assume that there is a minimum wage
equal to w1 for regular hours. Also we assume that w2 > w1 by regulation (see
footnote 13). We then go on to see what would happen if a union organizing
the labor force could determine wages (possibly both t h eb a s ea n do v e r t i m e
wages).
5.1 The ﬁrm deciding the overtime wage
I nA p p e n d i xBw es h o wt h a tt h eo p t i m a lo v e r t i m ew a g ei nt h i sc a s ei sg i v e n
by:
w2 ≥ (b +2 )
w1 (2 − b2)(2− b)+b2 (1 − b)
2 − b2 (27)
The above level of the overtime wage ensures that overtime will not be
used in equilibrium (n1 = n2). The ﬁrm will never want to induce the n3
option, as this in all cases implies utilizing costly overtime, when it could
instead push up prices with the use of a high overtime wage. Note also that
an inﬁnite overtime wage is not necessary, as there is a limit to how high the
ﬁrm wants to push prices due to the direct negative eﬀect on demand. We
thus have:
Proposition 4 If the ﬁrm can decide the overtime wage, it will set it suﬃ-
ciently high to provide a credible commitment not to use overtime.
Again, this result would hold more generally than for linear demand func-
tions, as should be clear from the above intuitive argument.
Next we study what would happen if a union could set wages:
5.2 Union wage setting
In this section we assume that a union sets either the overtime wage or both
t h eb a s ew a g ea n dt h eo v e r t i m ew a g e .T h e r ei sn oo b v i o u sw a yi nw h i c hw e
can study negotiations between the ﬁrm and the union over wages in this
set-up, as negotiations has to be concerned not only with wages, but also
with what kind of regime (n1,n 2,n 3) that will be induced in equilibrium.17
We therefore stick to a monopoly union framework.
17Technically, the elasticity of employment to labor diﬀers in the three regimes. Simple
bargaining models like, for instance, the Nash bargaining solution cannot, then, be applied
directly.
14While the ﬁrm maximizes expected proﬁts, the union will typically max-
imize some composite function positively related to both wages and employ-
ment. For simplicity, we start out with the very simple case where the base
wage is exogenous (possibly set by the authorities or a national labor union).
If the union can only aﬀect the overtime wage, the following result holds:
Remark 5 If a union sets the overtime wage only and is suﬃciently employment-
oriented, it will choose a wage above the same threshold as the ﬁrm would
have done.
The intuition behind this result is not diﬃcult to grasp: If the union
chooses a lower overtime wage (the only relevant option) than what the ﬁrm
itself would have wanted, then the ﬁrm has two options:
1. Choose a lower employment level to keep prices high (n2 option). This
r e d u c e se m p l o y m e n t ,b u td o e sn o ta ﬀect equilibrium pay (w1 unaf-
fected). Thus it cannot be better for a union caring positively about
employment.
2. Choose to signiﬁcantly reduce the work force, utilizing full overtime
and pushing up prices through the restricted capacity of the plant. The
employed members of the union may beneﬁt from the increased income
(working full overtime), but this beneﬁt comes only to a few as the ﬁrm
will cut employment massively to push up prices. Thus this option will
typically not be appealing if the union is employment-oriented.
Following the above Remark, one might wonder if unionization may have
any impact in our model. However, if the ﬁrm promises a high overtime wage
premium, it is not certain that this credibly restricts the ﬁrm. If an employee
wants to work at a lower premium, there is possibly no one that can prevent
this from happening. On the other hand, if a union sets the overtime wage,
the commitment could typically carry more weight. Thus, we can conclude:
Remark 6 If the union can credibly commit to a high overtime wage, while
the ﬁrm cannot, unionization may be proﬁtable for the ﬁrm.
Above, we discussed the case where the union could only set the overtime
wage. However, the union could possibly be involved in the determination
of both the base wage and the overtime wage. To this end, we assume that
the union can set both these wages. In order to obtain analytical solutions,
however, we need to make speciﬁc assumptions about union preferences. In






(w1)a(n1)1−a if w1 ≤ w∗
1
(w1)a(n2)1−a if w∗∗∗
1 >w 1 >w ∗
1
(w1 + γw2)a(n3)1−a if w1 ≥ w∗∗∗
1
(28)
a ∈ (0,1) is a measure of union wage-orientation.18




2−b2 ,w 2 ≥ w∗
2 if a ≤ 1
2
w1 + γw2 = a
(b+2)(1−b)(1+γ)
(2−b2) ,w 2 ≤ w∗∗





2 are also provided in Appendix C.
An employment-oriented union (a ≤ 1
2) chooses a high overtime wage,
which induces the ﬁrm to produce at normal capacity (without using over-
time). By contrast, a wage-oriented union (a>1
2) induces the ﬁrm to operate
at full capacity, which involves a higher total wage at the expense of lower
employment. These two options results in the same level of utility for a
rent-maximizing union (a = 1
2).
We have thus showed:
Proposition 7 An employment (wage) oriented union will choose a rela-
tively high (low) overtime wage, inducing the ﬁrm to choose a high (low)
level of employment and producing with no (full) use of overtime.
Usually, we would think that workers have a greater disutility from work-
ing an hour overtime than from a regular hour. If the union takes this into
consideration, it would tilt the union toward choosing a high overtime wage
(inducing high employment).
The result, that there will be high employment for a ≤ 1
2 and low em-
ployment for a>1
2, is dependent upon the linear demand system used in
this paper. For a = 1
2, t h el i n e a r i t ym a k e st h ew a g ea n de m p l o y m e n te ﬀects
(discussed above) cancel out. However, the result in Proposition 7 will hold
for a much wider range of demand functions: Say that the union is highly
18It is worth noting that in the overtime case, it is still employment (n) and not full
production (n(1 − γ)) that enters the union maximand. This is assumed for two reasons:
First, it is by no means clear that a union sees it as beneﬁcial that its members work
overtime per se. Rather, union members would possibly associate some disutility with
working overtime (not included in the analysis). Also, in the case of a = 1
2, the unions are
rent maximizers both under the overtime and the non-overtime regimes, which is a useful
property.
16employment-oriented. The union would then set a high overtime wage to
induce the ﬁrm to choose a large labor stock. In the opposite case, a very
wage-oriented union would want the highest possible total wage, not caring
much about employment. This means inducing the ﬁrm to produce using
overtime (at a high total wage w1 + γw2). Due to continuity, there exists
some intermediate level of union wage-orientation for which the union is in-
diﬀerent between the two options.
6R e g u l a t i o n
T h ew a g es t r u c t u r em a ya l s ob ei n ﬂuenced by public regulation. As noted
earlier, setting a high overtime wage could induce higher employment in the
relevant ﬁrm (Proposition 3). In addition, it is clear from the last section that
if the authorities are successful in passing legislation that eﬀectively causes
unions to act in a more employment-oriented manner, unemployment may
be reduced in industries where these kinds of considerations are important.
In this section we brieﬂy study three possible ways that the authorities
may aﬀect market outcomes: First the impact of minimum wage legislation
is discussed. We then turn to assessing the consequences of initiating a
minimum overtime pay premium. Third, we study the impact of restricting
the number of hours of overtime that any individual may work.
6.1 Minimum wages
In this section, we assume that the authorities set a base wage level, w1, which
cannot be undercut. If the ﬁrm unilaterally chooses the overtime wage, we
have showed that this would imply inducing the n1−option. From (25) it is
clear that if the base wage requirement is increased, equilibrium employment
falls. However, an increase in the base wage does not make the ﬁrm want
to pursue another strategy (n2,n 3), thus an increase in the minimum wage
never leads to a jump in unemployment. This could, however, happen in the
unionized case. For a highly employment-oriented union (a small), it may
be that the equilibrium base wage, given by (40), is low enough to violate
the minimum wage requirement. Thus the ﬁrst best option is not possible
for the union, which may then choose one of two strategies:
1. Set the base wage equal to the minimum wage and still choose a high
overtime wage, which induces a fairly high level of employment
2. Choose a high wage strategy where the ﬁrm employs fewer and utilizes
full overtime.
17The second option is not necessarily aﬀected by the minimum wage leg-
islation, as what is important for the union in this case is the total wage
(see (28)). The union could then possibly increase w1 and reduce w2 ac-
cordingly without violating any constraints. Thus a wage-oriented union
would typically still induce the ﬁrm to produce using full overtime. However,
an employment-oriented union may change its behavior: It could choose to
switch to a low employment/high wage strategy because the low base wage
is no longer possible:
Remark 8 A marginal increase in the minimum wage will likely have no
eﬀect if wages are set by a wage-oriented union, and it will only have a
marginal negative eﬀect on employment in the non-unionized case. If the
union is employment-oriented, however, stricter minimum wage legislation
may cause a discontinuous fall in employment.
It could be argued that minimum wage regulations may prove to be non-
restrictive in industries where unions have an important role in wage setting.
However, minimum wages could still restrict the options of an employment-
oriented union when, say, demand has dropped and (local) unions would like
to temporarily adjust their wage claims in order to prevent massive layoﬀs.
Nonetheless, it would not be unreasonable to argue that minimum overtime
mark-ups and caps on overtime hours may possibly turn out to be more
restrictive than minimum wages in a unionized set-up. We will discuss these
cases next.
6.2 Minimum overtime mark-up
We now assume that the authorities set a mark-up β, so that w2 ≥ (1+β)w1
is required by law.
If the ﬁrm can itself choose the overtime wage, this kind of regulation
would never change the optimal employment level. As we saw from the last
section, the ﬁrm will always be willing to choose a very high (even inﬁnite is
possible) overtime wage. This also holds for the case where an employment-
oriented union sets the wage.
The same is no longer necessarily true when a wage-oriented union chooses
t h ew a g e s . I nt h i sc a s ew ef o u n dt h a tt h e r ew a sa nupper limit on the
overtime wage (which ensured that the ﬁrm would choose to produce utilizing
overtime). The lowest possible w2 is such that w2 =( 1+β)w1. The internal
18optimum would then involve:
w2
(1 + β)
+ γw2 = a
(b +2 )( 1− b)(1+γ)
(2 − b2)
⇔ (30)
w2 = a(1 + β)
(b +2 )( 1− b)(1+γ)
(2 − b2)(1 + γ(1 + β))
(31)
It is easy to show that this overtime wage is increasing in β, which means
that the authorities, by increasing the mark-up requirement, can make the
ﬁrst-best option for a wage-oriented union impossible. Thus:
Remark 9 A minimum overtime mark-up will aﬀect employment only if
wage setting is unionized and unions are wage-oriented. In this case, such
regelation may induce a wage-oriented union to change its behavior, opting
for a strategy similar to what an employment-oriented union would choose.
Employment may then be signiﬁcantly increased.
Of course, a highly wage-oriented union strictly prefers the low employ-
ment/ high wage option. This would still be the case if the authorities sets
al o wβ. Thus, the regulated overtime pay premium would have to be quite
substantial for a highly wage-oriented union to choose a strategy involving
high employment and low total wages.
6 . 3 Ac a po no v e r t i m eh o u r s
In this section we discuss the possibility that the authorities may regulate
the number of hours of overtime any single employee is allowed to work. This
would amount to restricting γ.
As is clear from the previous discussion, a cap on overtime hours will
aﬀect the outcome neither when the ﬁrm sets the overtime wage nor when
wages are set by an employment-oriented union. This is, of course, due
to the fact that overtime is not utilized in equilibrium in either of these
cases. However, if wage setting is unionized and the union is wage-oriented,
regulation may have an eﬀect. To see this, note that from (29), the total wage
obtained by the union is an increasing function of γ. Thus a cap on overtime
hours reduces the total wage that is obtainable. There are two eﬀects that
determine the impact of such a regulatory scheme on employment: First, a
cap on overtime hours is the same as lowering plant capacity. Thus, if the
ﬁrm wants to operate at a given capacity, it would have to increase its labor
stock. Second, wages are cut as a result of regulation. This also induces the
ﬁrm to increase labor demand. Both these eﬀects are readily observed from
( 2 1 ) .T h u sw eh a v e :
19Remark 10 A cap on overtime hours will aﬀe c te m p l o y m e n to n l yi fw a g e
setting is unionized and unions are wage-oriented. In this case, the cap in-
creases equilibrium employment.
7 Conclusions and further remarks
In this paper, we utilized an imperfect competition model to study the im-
pacts of unionization, overtime pay premiums and regulation on labor de-
mand. We found that the authorities cannot obtain increased employment
by imposing stricter overtime pay premium legislation or caps on overtime
hours when labor is non-unionized, or if unions are employment-oriented.
This corresponds to the results from ‘ﬁxed job’-models. However, if unions
are wage-oriented, this result no longer applies, and stricter legislation of this
sort may induce increases in employment.
We also show that minimum wages may have the opposite eﬀect: Such
legal requirements will have no eﬀect in the case where a wage-oriented union
sets wages, will have only a limited employment-reducing eﬀect in the non-
union case, but may possibly have a negative impact on employment if unions
are employment-oriented.
Our model also predicts a spike in the distribution of hours per worker
at maximum regular hours (n). We found that in both the non-unionized
and the employment-oriented union cases, every employee works full normal
hours. In the wage-oriented union case, however, full overtime will be utilized
in equilibrium.
A serious shortcoming of the present model is that it does not include
hiring and ﬁring costs, which are potentially very important for the labor
demand and overtime decisions of ﬁrms. Also, the model neglects random-
ness. Overtime may to a high degree be used to deal with temporary demand
shocks, and this is why we never speciﬁe dt h a tt h eo v e r t i m ew a g es h o u l db e
inﬁnite in the cases where an employment-oriented union or the ﬁrm itself
sets the overtime wage. Instead we determined the minimum overtime pay
premium that a union or ﬁrm would choose. Thus the model does not pre-
clude the possibility that overtime may be used in speciﬁcp e r i o d s .R a t h e r ,
it provides a suﬃcient overtime wage level, ensuring that overtime would not
be used under normal circumstances.
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(2 + b)(1 − b) − (2 − b
2)w2
¢ (2 + b)(1 − b)+2 w2 − (4 − b2)w1
(1 − b2)(2− b)






((2 + b)(1− b)(1+γ) − (2 − b2)(w1 + γw2))
2
(1 + γ)
2 (1 − b2)(2− b2)
(33)
We leave it to the interested reader to verify that Π(n2) > Π(n3) for
w
−






w2 (2 − b2)(γ(4 + b2)+4 ( γ2 +1 ) )− (1 + γ)(2+b)(1− b)(b2 +4 γ)
(2 − b2)(4− b2)
(34)
+
2(1+γ)((2 + b)(1 − b) − w2(2 − b2))
p
2γ (2γ + b2)




w2 (2 − b2)(γ(4 + b2)+4 ( γ2 +1 ) )− (1 + γ)(b +2 )( 1− b)(b2 +4 γ)
(2 − b2)(4− b2)
(35)
−
2(1+γ)((2 + b)(1 − b) − w2(2 − b2))
p
2γ (2γ + b2)
(2 − b2)(4− b2)
We can then show that w
+








(2 + b)(1 − b)
2 − b2 (37)
Since we have implicitly assumed that w2 <
(2+b)(1−b)
2−b2 (n2 > 0), the above
restriction does not hold. Thus w∗∗∗
1 = w
−
1 . Following the previous discussion,









(2 + b)(1 − b)
2 − b2 (39)
As noted above, this is the case by assumption.
22BO v e r t i m e w a g e s s e t b y t h e ﬁrm
The proﬁts in the three relevant regimes are easily found from the results in
the main text. When setting the overtime wage, the ﬁrm then chooses
















(1+γ)2(1−b2)(2−b2) if w1 ≥ w∗∗∗
1
(40)
In the ﬁrst case, w2 does not aﬀect the proﬁts directly, but it does however
aﬀect the constraint w1 ≤ w∗
1. As w2 increases, w∗
1 increases. Thus if the
ﬁxed wage, w1, is such that the restriction w1 ≤ w∗
1 is initially violated, an
increase in the overtime wage might make the n1 option possible again. We
know also that this option is always better than choosing n2.T h u ss i n c ei t
does not bring about any costs for the ﬁrm, an increase in the overtime wage
so that w1 = w∗
1 will be proﬁtable as long as n3 is not even more proﬁtable.
In the n3 case, it is not the overtime wage, but rather the low labor stock
that induces a positive strategic feedback. A high overtime wage only reduces
proﬁts through more expensive overtime (which is fully in use). Thus setting
t h el o w e s tp o s s i b l eo v e r t i m ew a g ew o u l db ep r o ﬁtable in this situation (it is






(1+γ)2(1−b2)(2−b2) ] > 0, implying a corner
solution). Since w∗∗∗
1 is increasing in w2, t h el o w e s tp o s s i b l ew2 coincides with
the solution to w1 = w∗∗∗
1 . In this case, however, the n2 and n3 options are
equally proﬁt a b l e ,a n da sw eh a v en o t e db e f o r e ,t h en1 option can never be
worse than n2 when n1 is possible. Thus the equilibrium entails the ﬁrm
setting w2 such that w1 ≤ w∗
1, that is:
w2 ≥ (b +2 )
w1 (2 − b2)(2− b)+b2 (1 − b)
2 − b2 (41)
This level of the overtime wage provides the ﬁrm with a suﬃcient commit-
ment not to produce more than what can be achieved during regular hours.
Instead using the commitment provided by full overtime production involves
paying costly overtime. This is never favored by the ﬁrm.
23CU n i o n w a g e s e t t i n g





(w1)a(n1)1−a if w1 ≤ w∗
1
(w1)a(n2)1−a if w∗∗∗
1 >w 1 >w ∗
1
(w1 + γw2)a(n3)1−a if w1 ≥ w∗∗∗
1
(42)
T h eu n i o nd o e sn o ts t r i c t l yc a r ea b o u tt h eo v e r t i m ew a g ei nt h en1 case
as long as it can choose w1 freely (overtime is not used). Instead of inducing
the n2 state, it could do better (higher employment) if it instead chose w2
suﬃciently high as to make the n1 option possible. Thus, competing with a
possible n3 alternative is again an option where w1 ≤ w∗
1. In addition, the
optimal (base) wage claim under n1 is easily shown to be w1 = a(b +2 ) 1−b
2−b2.




2 − b2 ≤
4w2(2 − b2) − b2 (b +2 )( 1− b)





(b +2 )( 1− b)
a(4 − b2)+b2
2 − b2 , w
∗
2 (44)
Thus by setting w2 ≥ w∗
2, the union could also choose w1 = a(1 − b) b+2
2−b2
(which maximizes union utility assuming that no-overtime should be induced)
w i t h o u tf e a rt h a tt h eﬁrm may choose to set a low labor stock and utilize
overtime.
By choosing w1 and w2 such that w1 ≥ w∗∗∗
1 , the union could also induce








w1 + γw2 = a(b +2 )( 1− b)
1+γ
2 − b2 (46)
Combining this with the condition w1 ≥ w∗∗∗
1 yields:
a(b +2 )( 1− b)
1+γ
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2 − b2
b2(1 − a)+4 ( a + γ)+2
p
2γ (2γ + b2)
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24Thus the union would choose between the following two options:
U =
(
U1 for w1 = a
(1−b)(2+b)
2−b2 ,w 2 ≥ w∗
2
U3 for w1 + γw2 = a
(2+b)(1−b)(1+γ)






















The union will, of course, induce the regime that produces the higher util-
ity. By comparing the two expressions, it is easily shown that the equilibrium
is given by (29).
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